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Abstract
Alvin Gouldner's life and work is considered within the frame-
work of his own attempt to fashion a reflexive sociology dur-
ing the second ha!f ofhis career. In the first ha!f, Gouldner was
a functionalist and dutifullY contributed insights and theoreti-
cal innovations to the paradigm, even while remaining criti-
cal of Talcott Parsons' own version ofstructura/functional-
ism. Later; by 1962, Gouldner broke from the dominant tra-
dition to become an outspoken critique ofestablishment sociol-
ogy, in the process becoming more sympathetic to competing-
theories, especiallY Marxism. Eventualty, Marxism, too, was
found to be inadequate because of its lack ofreflexivity, and
Gouldner became further alienated from both traditions ofso-
ciology. ConcomitantlY, Gosldner was battling on personal
and professional fronts in his role ofsocial critic. He became
increasinglY hostile toward others for their willing compliance
with prevailing cultural prescriptions, which he believed were
robbing human beings of their agency, vitality, and wil' to
power. Lacking authentic knowledge ofoneself, one could not
hope to create social theories which benefited society and con-
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tributed to the liberation ofthe human spirit. Gouldner was a
tragic hero, for although he came to an understanding of the
limitations of human strivings in creating sociallY beneficial
social theory, and fought valiantlY to establish a program to
fill this lacuna, he ultimatery failed to deliver upon the prom-
ise of these insights because of his own hubris (on the personal
front) and the internal paradoxes of reflexive sociology (on the
professional front).
Learning from Gouldner
When we talk about what we can "learn" from a particular
person's ideas, we need to go about the business of defining more
precisely what sorts of things we want to learn, and for what
purpose(s). These questions are of course intimately connected to
the particular interests of the audience to whom one is convey-
ing such information. I presume that since the core audience of
interest here is sociologists and social scientists more generally,
whatever is of abiding interest in Gouldner's thought must some-
how be shown to be of relevance to the sorts of issues and ques-
tions sociologists are confronting and asking today.
But the business of identifying the central issues or topics of abid-
ing interest to contemporary sociologists is not as easy or straight-
forward as it might appear. The conundrum is that sociology is
a broad discipline encompassing virtually the entire spectrum of
conceivable social phenomena. Just about anything occurring
in the social world has, or soon will be, treated in some way or
another by sociologists. Many years ago Gouldner (1956, 1957,
1962, 1976b) himself tried to downplay the too easy distinctions
some of us make regarding what are or are not worthy topics of
sociological theory and research. The old "pure" versus "applied"
knowledge debate always lurks just around the corner whenever
one attempts to go about the business of identifying topics of
"relevance" to a scholarly audience.
200
Alvin W. Gouidner and the Tragic Vision in Sociology
As much as anything, Gouldner's legacy to sociology can be
understood as a call to sociologists to be wary of the extracognitive
factors influencing the types of research agendas we pursue and
the allegiances we develop-to other colleagues, to funding agen-
cies, to institutions-along the way (see especially Gouldner 1968,
1969, 1975). Here is where the Gouldnerian legacy becomes a
source of frustration for those of us who simply want to get on
with the business of explaining, predicting, and describing as-
pects of the social world. That is, Kuhn (1970) once stated that
traditional science works best when it has its blinders on. The
1940s and 50s were an especially good time for sociology in terms
of its growing legitimacy in the eyes of the academy, the state,
and society more generally. Of course in the 1960s sociology
reached a peak in terms of number of sociology undergraduate
majors and number of persons writing sociology master's theses
and dissertations (see Turner and Turner 1990). But it was also a
period of increasing criticism of the discipline from within, and
Gouldner (1970) was certainly a central player contributing to
these criticisms of academic or establishment sociology. Among
other things, this increasing criticism reflected a greater disci-
plinary self-awareness as sociology became established and be-
gan to take for granted the utility, efficaciousness, and desirabil-
ity of its theories, interests, and knowledge claims.
If we were to single out one person who could be said to have
presided over the growth of sociology during this period, it would
have to be Talcott Parsons. Parsons' entire career was devoted
to trying to bring sociology to the table of science, a legacy bril-
liantly summarized in Klausner and Lidz's Nationalization of the
Social Sciences (1986). Parsons believed that the force of reason-
"cognitive rationality," as he called it-once channeled appropri-
ately along the lines of positivistic science, would indeed lead us
to uncovering the timeless laws of the social universe, thereby
eventually fulfilling Comte's utopian vision of a social world
characterized by social justice and the elimination of misery and
oppression.
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Why then did Gouldner become such a vocal critic of Parsons
beginning in the 1950s and extending on until his own death in
1980? When Parsons died in 1979, Gouldner offered this mov-
ing and heartfelt remembrance of Parsons:
Talcott Parsons was a very special man and played a very
special role. It is a mark of his achievement that most of us
who became sociologists after World War II felt constrained
to define our own intellectual position in relation to his
own work. We also noted the very special way he walked
through the world. Although a thinker of great stature, he
was a diffident, tentative, indeed humble man, accessible to
young people whom he did not know, and quite approach-
able by all at public meetings.... I knew him as a thoughtful
and kind man who, despite a legion of responsibilities, still
found time to chat with visitors at Harvard. He never for-
got to fill his guests' glasses. I remember him, too, at the
meetings of the American Sociological Society in St. Louis
in 1961, steadfastly and successfully resisting efforts to im-
.pose a racially discriminatory use of hotel facilities upon
our convention. Unlike some intellectuals, who demand
great personal license in exchange for their brilliance, he
moved quietly among us trying to be a good man rather
than pretending to be a god. t (Gouldner 1979b, pp. 300-
301)
Gouldner was in rare form here. He generally was not quite so
gracious and accommodating in his comments about others.
Indeed, legends about Gouldner's belligerent interpersonal style
and impatience with others, be they colleagues, students, or oth-
ers abound. He was a powder keg ready to explode. At times-
often-he was an angry, hostile, and vindictive man.
Yet Gouldner the scholar was quite an acceptable, and indeed
welcome sight for many. Although he had a confrontational
and aggressive teaching style, most every student of Gouldner's
with whom I have spoken suggest that they learned a lot from
him, and were challenged to develop deeper and more sophisti-
cated skills of observation, analysis, and interpretation. Among
the things we can learn from Gouldner, then, is how he negoti-
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ated the dichotomies that marked him as both a man and as a
scholar. The bifurcated nature of Gouldner's work and life is
captured in his penchant for playing the insider/outlaw game.
The Insider/Outlaw Game
Whether by design or for some other reason (the unfolding of
the Geist, unconscious motivation, the structure of higher edu-
cation, imitation) Gouldner played the role of insider/outlaw
consistently throughout his career. Early on, during his days at
Columbia University studying under Merton and then on to a
successful career as an industrial sociologist during the 1950s and
early 60s, Gouldner was a functionalist and consummate insider
to establishment sociology. Granted, his version of functional- .
ism was in opposition to the Parsonian variety, seeing as how
Merton was attempting to establish his own brand of functional-
ism based upon middle-range propositions, the case method, and
the introduction of concepts such as latent and manifest func-
tion, as-well as dysfunctions. Gouldner was trained by Merton
to maintain a critical eye toward received wisdom, and to not
accept it merely on the basis of its wide acceptance or the per-
ceived moral authority, competence, or brilliance of its author
or authors.
Although Gouldner was critical of Parsons from early in his ca-
reer, his aim, at least initially, was not to cripple or eradicate
functionalism, but to rehabilitate it by overcoming the weak-
nesses of the establishment version of functionalism, especially
with regard to its tendency toward illegitimate teleology (system
"needs") and the conservative implications of its (parsons') "ob-
session" with value consensus as the basis of social order.
For example, in his 1960 article ''The Norm of Reciprocity" (still
his single-most heavily cited paper), the lacuna that Gouldner
raised to conscious awareness and then attempted to fill was that,
although many authors had previously dealt with the issue of
203
Social Thought & Research
reciprocity in social relations, no one had gone to the trouble of
defining the term explicitly. This failure to define reciprocity
reflected a taken-for-grantedness on the part of social theorists
about its unquestioned importance in contributing to stable so-
cial relations. As such, reciprocity tended to enter through the
backdoor, always lying at the heart of social explanation, but
rarely avowed or even noticed by theorists themselves. The as-
sumptions concerning reciprocity reside, then, at a tacit subtextual
(infrastructural) level of functionalist theory, and Gouldner was
concerned with analyzing the implications for functionalism once
their importance is recognized and overtly acknowledged.
One such implication is connected with functionalism's glossing
over the possibility that the power differentials between Ego and .
Alter (or between any units in the social system) may be large.
In this case, Ego may force Alter to benefit it with little or no
reciprocity. Although on the surface stable social relations could
appear to be maintained even with such power disparities, the
"stable" social system that functionalists portray is not quite what
it appears to be. In fact, functionalism's silence on the possibil-
ity of power differentials and coercion as the basis of social order
(rather than consensus) represents a critical theory that could be
cracked open from functionalism if only theorists such as Par-
sons were self-reflexive enough to understand the implications
of their tacit assumptions about reciprocity. As Gouldner (1960)
states, "In any event, the present analysis of reciprocity opens up .
long-neglected questions, yielding a new perspective on the rela-
tion between functional theory and the concepts of 'survival'
and 'exploitation.' In the latter case, moreover, intimations.
emerge of some of the ways in which two diverse theoretical
traditions contain surprising convergences" (p. 167). This idea
of a convergence between functionalism and Marxism would in, ..
fact become one of the major elements of Gouldner's (1970)
ing crisis" thesis.
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Gouldner's penchant for analyzing extant theory and cracking
open its unstated assumptions-a program of inquiry which
Gouldner would develop explicitly in the guise of reflexive soci-
ology-derives, as we have seen, from the training he received
from Merton at Columbia University. Gouldner felt this was a
viable way of contributing to the development of sociological
theory, insofar as the program was aimed at solving some of the
persistent problems of functionalist theory, rather than working
to overthrow it entirely. Because Parsonian structural function-
alism was dominant during this time, the 50s and early 60s-in
an earlier paper I (Chriss 1995b) calculated that Parsons' influ-
ence peaked in 1963-Gouldner's paper on reciprocity was writ-
ten in a tolerant, scholarly tone that, while critical, nevertheless
reflected his continuing-but by this time waning-immersion
in what he would later deride as "establishment" sociology. In-
deed, at this time Gouldner still clung to a positivistic world view,
reflected for example in his view of science: "The task of the
sociologist, in this regard, parallels that of the physicist who seeks
to identify the basic particles of matter, the conditions under
which they vary, and their relations to one another" (Gouldner
1960, p. 171). This should immediately be contrasted with the
position Gouldner was taking a decade later, where he was be-
coming more sympathetic to hermeneutics, this being a method
in which "the theorist is regarded as being more like an art or
architectural critic than a physicist" (Gouldner 1972, p. 15). This
represents quite a radical transition from a physicalist to a sym-
bolist frame of reference.
Gouldner's unique perspective on the silent role of reciprocity
in functionalist theory led him to ask questions that other func-
tionalists rarely asked themselves. Although functionalists had
dealt with the positive functions of reciprocity, namely, its stabi-
lizing function for the broader social system, Gouldner notes
that, because functionalists have rarely been concerned with eti-
ology, they have thereby neglected the possibility that reciproc-
ity is not only a stabilizing mechanism but also a "starting mecha-
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nisrn." That is, the norm of reciprocity not only stabilizes social
relationships, but may also be functional in the early stages of .
development of a social system and the institutionalization of
role relationships, before a customary set of such status duties
have been established.
In this case, according to Gouldner, "we find ourselves outside
the usual perspective of functional theory" (Gouldner 1960, p.
176). In fact, functionalism's interest in already established so-
cial systems, to the neglect of their social origins, reflects a decid-
edly presentist bias which opens up functionalism (and especially
Parsons) to the charges of conservatism and that it is merely a
defender of the status quo. Still, Gouldner is not suggesting that
functionalism cannot accommodate historical or hermeneutic
methods. Although it at first may appear alien to functionalists,'
the consideration .of reciprocity as a starting mechanism is pos-
sible and wholly within the scope of functionalist theory, ac-
cording to Gouldner, if only functionalists were more overt and
diligent in analyzing and reflecting upon their own tacit assump-
tions about the world (Gouldner 1960, p. 177).
All the while that Gouldner was playing the game of insider to
establishment sociology, however, he was preparing for a meta-
morphosis into an outlaw functionalist/Marxist insider.
Gouldner was born in Harlem in 1920, and was part of the large ';:-. t •
wave of sons and daughters of the second and third generations .'~'
of Jewish immigrants who had come to America beginning in....··~·~t:L .~l,~
the 1880s. He attended City College of New York, and gradu':'··;~~:~'''~~:i:::~·::.:Jr
ated with a BBA in 1941. City College was a feeder to Columbia r] ...~~~~~;',:i·f
University and other prestigious institutions of higher learning,._,:'~~;;;,~ .
and by the time Gouldner had arrived at Columbia in 1943, het,l~;'~;.;'~
had already developed radical political sensibilities (which ·was~.:;;~~~:i~~~
somewhat of an oddity considering he was coming out of the.~.~~~If~~t/l.c ,
business school). Gouldner was in fact a Stalinist in his early.:":'::';~~t.{~ '.
~'.":"~;""'Hdays, and was a member of several socialist organizations duringj..i~fI1··. .
. . .. . ' ";':'~~~~~:';~)'
the 1940s (Miller 1981; Page 1982.) Yet 10 his dissertation, parts/\~~~*(~~-'
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of which eventually wound up as his first two books, Patterns of
Industrial Bureaucracy (1954a) and Wildcat Strike (1954b),
Gouldner rarely even mentioned Marx, choosing instead the
"safer" critical theory of Max Weber. (This also made sense since
Weber had put organizational analysis on the map with his theory
of bureaucracy.)
Why was Marx absent from Gouldner's early work? Some
(Burawoy 1982; Stein 1982) suggest that, as his books were com-
ing to press in the 1950s, the specter of Joseph McCarthy hung
over the heads of many scholars with Marxist or socialist sympa-
thies, and he opted for a pragmatic solution to his dilemma. Re-
gardless, by the 1960s Gouldner had almost completely forsaken
academic or establishment sociology in favor of critical theory
of the Marxist variety.
Gouldner would eventually go on to publish many critical, even
strident renunciations of Parsons and academic sociology (the
most well-known being of course The Coming Crisis of Western
Sociology) while turning his attentions more and more to Marx-
ism, intellectuals and their culture of critical discourse, and ide-.
ology and technology. Gouldner would eventually find fault
with Marxism as well, because it too was insufficiently self-re-
flexive, e.g., Marx's theory of the proletarian revolt cannot ac-
count for how Marx, from a bourgeois background, came to
acquire a proletarian consciousness. It appears to refute his theory
that the material conditions of existence that persons experience
in their everyday lives account for the ideas they come to hold
about the world (Gouldner 1980). Gouldner thus makes another
transformation from Marxist insider to Marxist outlaw. He had
seen, and experienced as a lived conviction, the dark side of the
dialectic. Rather than pursuing this issue further, let us turn to
1965, with the publication of Enter Plato, his study of the social
origins of social theory and the transitions in thought that took
place from Socrates to Plato.
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Enter Plato
In many ways EnterPlato mirrors Gouldner's own life. Gouldner
clearly has great respect and admiration for ancient Greek soci-
ety, its men, and its ideas. For example, Gouldner lauds the
Greek's shame culture-where what's considered important are
the perceptions and opinions of others rather than one's own
thoughts or self-assessments-as opposed to that which charac-
terizes modern society-namely a guilt culture, whereby people
turn inward onto their own thought and feelings, thereby giving
rise to unhealthy trends such as egoistic individualism. Because
others' opinions of you count so much, the Greeks developed
the contest system that acted as a mechanism for overtly assess-
ing the ways in which selves are being viewed in the eyes of the
broader society. The contest system in essence, then, serves to
objectivity the shame culture.
Obviously, the contest system can lead to distortions in inter-
personal relations, as people might be prone to act strategically
in their own interests with regard to guarding or maintaining
their own status or position in society at the expense of others.
Because of the intense competition arising out of a shame cul-
ture, the Greeks were concerned, indeed obsessed with the im-
perfections of human beings and society, realizing that one of
our (their) greatest tragedies is that we all suffer from vanity,
pride, and a deep sense of hubris-that is, insolence, wanton vio-
lence, and outrage. This mortal flaw was a constant threat to
reasoned and collegial discourse between men and women, as
Plato suggested. Indeed, Gouldner championed the idea of the
Greek dialectic, characterized as a reasoned search for the truth
where ideas are exchanged and claims are made amongst a group
of colleagues. The problem with this ideal speech situation, if I
may borrow a phrase from Habermas (1984, 1987), is that it al-
ways runs the risk of breaking down into undesirable forms of .. '..... :<..::;:r~.:':~.I,~t'.,
exchange where people engage in innuendo, ad hominem attacks,
and defensiveness. This form of distorted communication is la-
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beled eristic, that is, communication that is characterized as cap-
tious and full of strife, quarrels, and wrangling. Rather than
seeking the truth through reasoned dialogue, persons engaging
in eristic discourse seek to humiliate and destroy the other.
Without being too melodramatic, I would suggest that Gouldner
identified with Greek culture to such an extent, and adopted
Plato's desperate attempt to fashion the just society as his own,
because his own life was similar to a Greek tragedy. In many
ways Gouldner was a protagonist in a Greek drama, and this
played out both in his professional and private lives. Through
the role he played as academic insider/oudaw, and' through the
life he led as a "difficult" person who violated the sensibilities of
many he came into contact with because of his own personal
hubris, Gouldner felt a kinship with the despair and fatalism
that the ancient Greeks felt whenever they faced their own limi-
tations and failings as human beings.
Gouldner links his study of ancient Greek philosophy to con-
temporary social theory by suggesting that the history of social
theory is an intellectual genre comprised of at least three parts-
history, sociology, and criticism-and that the most important
role the historian of social theory plays is that of critic. The role
of critic, at least within the context of modern social science with
its emphasis on quantitative methods and the assumption of value-
free knowledge, has become largely inimical to the goal of build-
ing a cumulative science that sees little utility in visiting and re-
flecting back upon great intellectual predecessors. That is, ac-
cording to the tenets of positivism and the cumulative nature of
scientific knowledge, whatever is useful in the thought of earlier
generations of thinkers has presumably been absorbed into cur-
rent disciplinary canons. Hence the history per se of theorists is
rendered at best an academic exercise reserved largely for gradu-
ate students, while at worst, a waste of time representing the
height of intellectual solipsism and disciplinary navel-gazing.
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The critic finds him-or herself caught up in the tension betwee
affirming the creative potential of the individual (insofar as thn
critic bucks the trend toward disciplinary parochialism), and
opposing the demands of conformity to established institutions
and culturally standardized roles (Gouldner 1965, p. 170). The
critic hates routinization of his or her professional role; derives
little pleasure from the traditional rewards the university con-
fers upon him or her (for example, good student evaluations or
peer reviews, or the occasional merit-based promotion along the
tenure track); resists compromising his or her beliefs for the sake
of political expediency; cares more for the creativity of a schol-
arly performance rather than its reliabiliry or utiliry. In sum, the
critic detests the domestication of intellectual life in whatever fonn
it takes.
Indeed, this is what Gouldner describes as the "tragic" dimen-
sion in science, especially as this pertains to the reflexive and
critical social theorist. As Gouldner (1975-76, p. 23) states, "To
be a practitioner of 'critique' means in part to employ a stand-
point outside of a normal science and its established paradigms."
Again, returning to a sentiment from Kuhn, adapting the role of
social critic removes the blinders that make normal science mo-
tivating and possible (Nord 1992, p. 353).
The critic, then, must always be aware of the disjunction be-
tween his own profession and himself, and must struggle cease--
lessly against surrendering herself to routine and the cozy "perks"
of intellectual life (whatever there really are of them). Gouldner
(1965) states:
The historical mission of the social theorist is to assist man-
kind in taking possession of society. The task of the histo-
rian of theory is to assist us in taking possession of our own
intellectual heritage, past or present, by appraising it ac-
tively-which is to say, critically-in terms of our viable
interests. (p. 170)
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Being a critic also means being aware of one's tacit (domain) as-
sumptions about the world. Only through such a program of
self-reflexivity, whereby theorists make an overt connection be-
tween the technical level of theory and its infrastructure (assump-
tions about epistemology, ontology, and axiology), can theorists
hope to produce theories that maintain fidelity with the empiri-
cal social world. But if indeed social theorists are to embrace the
role of critic, as Gouldner espouses, how far can or should this
critical, self-reflexive method be taken? Isn't it likely the case
that somewhere along the way such a self-reflexive program of
critical theory will reach a point of diminishing return? Can a
line easily be drawn between criticism for the sake of clarifying
one's philosophical commitments, on the one hand, and criti-
cism merely for the sake of criticism, on the other? Also, doesn't
such a strong emphasis on self-reflexivity defeat the hopes or
aspiration of an other-directed, shame culture characterized by
reasoned discourse as embodied in the Greek dialectic?
Gouldner seemed to have arrived at the horns of this dilemma
near the end of his life, and was leaning toward the position that
indeed the program of self-reflexivity becomes a "runaway norm"
which, by collapsing back upon itself and bringing into doubt
the very foundations of its own assumptions and cognitive frame-
work through endless cycles of self-critique, ultimately
disestablishes everything in its path, including itself.
This appears to be the tragic fate of the critical social theorist,
and signals the dead-end of Gouldner's version of reflexive soci-
ology. Alvin Gouldner's life and work reflected this eternal
struggle with the internal contradictions of legitimate knowledge,
and how to maintain critical insights into that knowledge rather
than accepting it passively, the latter of which serving merely to
reaffirm and accept the status quo. There have been many forms
of oppression justified on the basis of the status quo, and Gouldner
tried to create a program of inquiry that was alive and sensitive
to this reality.
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One particular question that Gouldner struggled with, then, was:
How does one simultaneously create legitimate knowledge that
is both liberating and humane, but without going in the direc-
tion of radical or egoistic individualism (such as what has hap-
pened with the emphasis on "self-esteem" and "empowerment"
that afflicts psychology, management, and the modern therapeu:...
tic state more generally [see Chriss 1999b]; or the faddish appro-
priation by educational institutions of the potentially liberative
program of "critical thinking," especially the Freirean tradition)?
With both academic sociology and Marxism failing to live up to
the task because of their lack of reflexivity, Gouldner believed,
for awhile anyway, that he had located the historical actor or
class that could deliver such a program, namely, the New Class
of intellectuals armed with their own unique language variant,
the culture of critical discourse. But they too, described by
Gouldner (1979a) as a "flawed universal class," failed to deliver
the goods. In order to understood this tragic state of affairs, we'
need to return to Gouldner's writings on the link between per-.
sonal reality and social theory.
Gouldner's Personal Reality and Social Theory
A theme we have already touched upon is Gouldner's "difficult"
personality, and how this affected him in the role of intellectual
and social critic. By Gouldner's own definition of intellectuals,
technical intelligentsia, and the New Class, Gouldner himself :.··J"-,··:,c,.:.',·:.,li;:.imiif.,,;,'
was a member of this New Class of intellectuals. We have also
seen evidence that Gouldner became alienated from both stan- rc···;·.•":.";.~·'·.J,";>iF...,.~·
dard sociology and Marxism over his career, thus staying true,' 'f,:::i:::::·.~~::~.~m':;~·
self-reflexively, to his general insight that the New Class is a
universal class.
Gouldner was notorious for having a volcanic temperament,
his interpersonal belligerence, and for his zealous-some
say overzealous-application of the Socratic Method in his
room (even going so far as occasionally driving students to tears).
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Indeed, Lewis Coser (1982) once said that "He [Gouldner] knew,
as he once wrote to his lifelong friend Robert K. Merton, that
many people considered him a son of a bitch, and he half agreed
with their assessment" (p. 888).
Intellectuals who commit themselves to a program of critical social
theory tend to experience blocked ascendance, in terms of their
progression through the ranks of education or government, be-
cause they may step on some well-heeled toes as they articulate
the links between others' personal realities, economic interests,
practices, and claims of professional expertise. As Gouldner
(1979a) states, "The impairment of the New Class's upward
mobility, either politicallY or economicallY, contributes to their
alienation." Critical social theorists are also angry because some
part of the world they cherish is in decline or disarray, and they
hate the complacency of others for not attending to these patho-
logical conditions or caring about the plight of the oppressed.
In taking the stance of the critic, genuinely reflexive social theo-
rists seem to have no other choice but to wear their personal
animus on their sleeve. To do otherwise would be to repress the
inexorable link between personal realities and social theory, be-
tween private troubles and public issues (Mills 1959). Gouldner
was throughout his career ambivalent at best, and oftentimes
hostile towards, the world of mere appearances, as represented
especially in Erving Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical theory of
action (see, e.g., Gouldner 1965, 1970, 1975-76, 1976a; Young
1971). Gouldner hated other things as well of course, including
"Stalinism, structural theories, bureaucracy, statism, vanguard
parties and the sociological establishment" (Alt 1981, p. "198).
Goffman developed a theory of modernity which suggests that
through an elaborate structure of interaction rituals-tact, diplo-
macy, norms of politeness, body glass, facework, partitioning of
front and back stages, role distance-actors maintain civility,
decorum, and working definitions of the situation. But from
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Gouldner's perspective, such games of deference and accomma,
dation serve to mask the "true" feeling and perspectives of ac-
tors, thus creating the conditions for greater distortion of corn.
munication as well as the tacit affirmation of the status quo.
Gouldner's passion for speaking the truth, then, made him en-
emies among those whose livelihoods or professional interests' .
were at stake were the truth to be told. As Aya (1982, p. 907)
suggests, Gouldner even considered universities and other insti-
tutions that put a premium on civility and collegiality as inhibit~
ing of self-reflexivity and truth-telling as authoritarian political
regimes. Indeed, Gouldner (1973, p. 77) once wrote that "Pro-
fessional courtesy stifles intellectual curiosity; the teeth of piety
bite the tongue of truth." On this point, Gouldner would agree; .
then, with Habermas (1984) and Argyris and Schon (1974) that
truth-telling is part and parcel to reasoned communication.
Hence; politeness and other etiquette norms-the basis of
Goffman's dramaturgy-are cast into the realm of the irrational
since they can work to mask persons' truthful assessments of a
situation (Chriss 1995a, p. 550).
Gouldner as Tragic Hero
How has it arisen in modern society that so much emphasis
being placed on the self, including heavy doses of self-revelation ·;·~~,,':,':.f'~·.v.:'.:'i~'
(or disclosure), self-presentation, and self-analysis (or reflexivity),
and how does this turn toward the self relate to Gouldner an-d
the tragic vision more generally? As we have seen, the '--6.1.."-"-.1.'..0
held out the tragic hero as one who worked against all odds.
make the world a better place, but who because of his or
own fallibility (pride, envy, blind hatred, wanton lust, hubris)". "'<,:;.~'\:'.:;;:';.:"€R.i!~"
failed the ultimate tests of truth, honor, bravery, or ¥p.rlp.n,nt-tnn
From the ancient Greek perspective, since the tragic hero
mately cannot be redeemed because of the inherent urmtanons
and fallibilities of the human condition, the only place to tum to
are the gods.
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The rise of Enlightenment rationalism and scientism ushered in
a massive repudiation of god and religion, and in this new form
of secular humanism it was human beings who would make their
own destiny and who would perfect human society on their own
terms. The modern tragic hero is different, then, than the one
portrayed in earlier times. Nietzsche's (1956) writings embody
the modernist loss of certitude about the meaning of life, indeed,
the sheer senselessness, absurdity, and nihilism of a life that lacks
gods and other ultimate values, where men and 'women retreat
back into their "selves" in a desperate search for meaning and
foundation (Featherstone 1995, pp. 61-62).2 Consider Charles
Glicksberg's (1963, p. 69) apt characterization of the modern tragic
hero:
The tragic vision today thus culminates in a naked revela-
tion of self, without the affirmation of values that lie be-
yond the sphere of the natural. The absurd hero, who is
absurd even when he rebels, struggles painfully but reso-
lutely toward the goal of full disclosure. Nothing can deter
him from this passionate commitment to the truth. This is
the distinctive mark of his tragic consciousness: he forges
ahead despite his knowledge that he can do nothing to alter
his lot. ...If he feels "guilty," it is not because he has trans-
gressed against the laws of God but because he has violated
his inner self or failed to keep faith with his fellow man, all
of whom are victims of death but privileged beings for that
very reason.
I would suggest that the above description of the modern tragic
hero fits Gouldner remarkable well. Gouldner dutifully worked
within the functionalist perspective early in his career, and clung
tenaciously to the physicalist framework of positivistic social
science until 1962, the year in which a peculiar little book was
published entitled Notes on Technology and the Moral Order
(Gouldner and Peterson 1962). Gouldner had spent the previ-
ous summer immersed in an intense workshop on quantitative
methods and the newest statistical techniques, including factor
analysis. Through factor analysis, Gouldner and Peterson (1962)
hoped to settle once and for all a persistent problem of func-
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tional analysis, specifically, its circular reasoning insofar as the
social system was typically conceptualized as a system of inter-
dependent parts in which all parts and subsystems affected all
the other parts and subsystems. In this way functionalism ex-
plained everything, thereby explaining nothing.
Factor analysis promised a way of holding constant certain vari-
ables in a system of multiple variables or factors, thereby allow-
ing determination of the relative "loading" or influence of each
variable of interest. Gouldner and Peterson used as their data
the Human Relations Area Files, which contained information
on 71 primitive or pre-industrial societies. The authors grouped
the data into various factors, such as Factor L, which was a mea-
sure of lineality; Factor SD, or sex dominance; Factor T, or level
of technology; and the remarkable Factor A, their measure of
morality which they dubbed "norm-sending." The A in Factor
A stood for Apollonianism, which Gouldner and Peterson ap-
propriated directly from Nietzsche's (1956) study of tragedy and
the genealogy of morals." Nietzsche had suggested that ancient
Greek society and certain other societies of antiquity were char-
acterized by a Dionysian complex emphasizing such things as
the pleasures of the flesh, rapture and intoxication, a tragic view.
of the world, and the acceptance of the terrors and horrors of
existence. In contrast, later more rationalized societies were la-
beled as Apollonian, whose primary characteristic was "impulse
control." Some of the factors included in the Apollonian ideal
type were "freedom from all extravagant urges"; the stressing of
cognitive modes of experience; reason, knowledge, and science;
and "know thyself," Gouldner and Peterson found that societies
which scored high on Factor A also tended to score high on
Factor T, technology.
Although Gouldner seemed to have arrived at a new level of
sophistication regarding functional analysis and an improved
ability to judge the relative importance of variables in contribut- . '''',-'.''';''<'':'c'!'l''''.;
ing to certain features or structures of the social system (here, .
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the link between technology and morality), he seemed also to
realize the extraordinary irony and incongruity of calling upon
Nietzsche to help order his quantitative data and provide cor-
roboration for his thesis. As Gouldner and Peterson (1962, p.
32) state,
. ..we are unhappily aware that, at this point, we may lose
some of our remaining readers. We may lose those who
feel that tainted philosophers have no place in a pure social
science, or those whose liberal views are offended by
Nietzsche's seeming anti-Semitism, or those who simply can-
not bear the presumably gross incongruity of juxtaposing
philosophical poetry and statistical analysis.
Notes on Technology and the Moral Order was indeed Gouldner's
last, desperate attempt to make sociology meaningful within the
framework of functionalism and orthodox sociology. Beginning
in 1962 and extending through his engagement with Plato in 1965
and on through the early 1970s with his increasingly strident
denunciations of functionalism and establishment sociology,
Gouldner's writings were characterized by an existential angst
which expressed despair within modern sociology (pavlich 1995,
p. 548). This despair is the embodiment of Weber's (1947) la-
ment regarding the rise of technical-instrumental rationality and
the fact that modern men and women were increasingly becom-
ing trapped in an "iron cage" of bureaucracy and technocracy.
Gouldner's realization was that sociology's unreflective embrace
of positivism and the tenet of objective knowledge makes soci-
ologists less vital and potent as actors in the world because they
subordinate their own human judgments, hunches, insights, and
designs for action to a sterile Apollianism embodied in a set of
doctrinaire slogans designating "good science." As Gouldner
(1969, p. xxxvii) explains,
The sociological enterprise, like others, becomes edged with
a tragic sense, I suspect, precisely because in confining work
to the requirements of a demanding and unfulfillable para-
digm [positivism], sociologists are not using themselves up
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in their work but are, indeed, sacrificing unexpressed parts
of themselves-their playful impulses, their unverified
hunches, and speculative imagination-in a wager that this
sacrifice is "best for science."
Gouldner suggests that men and women surmount tragedy only.
when they "use themselves up fully," wherever they are, and in
whatever situation they find themselves, even if this means ig-
noring certain prevailing cultural prescriptions and acting in in-
novative or even deviant ways. In order to do this, men and
women must accept their own unique talents and ambitions as
authentic, and "must not cleave compulsively to a culturally pre-
scribed and historically transient definition of what they should .
be doing scientifically." That is, sociologists escape tragedy only
when they recognize that they need not allow themselves to be
assimilated to their cultural masks (Gouldner 1969, p. xxxvi).
Again, we see here Gouldner railing against dramaturgical con-
formity and compliance, and against the inauthentic modern.
selves which positivistic social science forces people to claim for
themselves (see also Gouldner 1976a, 1976b).
Nightmare Reflexive Sociology?
Gouldner's attempt to rectify his earlier misguided allegiance to
establishment sociology led him on a perilous journey back, ironi-
cally enough, to the heart of establishment sociology. Gouldner
embraced the role of social critic with a vengeance, and tena-
ciously battled sociologists-friends and foes alike-on a variety
of fronts. By offering. himself as a model of how real flesh-and-
blood sociologists might escape their tragic fate and make a dif-
ference in the world, Gouldner incurred the wrath of the socio-
logical establishment and seriously damaged himself-both pro-
fessionally and personally, in the process. In an excoriating re-
view of Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, Leo Kaplan (1971, p'.,
66) effectively makes Gouldner out to be both martyr and tragic
hero:
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Meanwhile, the saintly Gouldner, alone in his pristine pu-
rity, feels disgust, and, fighting off the seven deadly sins
that surround him on all sides, pursues relentlessly, dialec-
tically, reflexively, critically, intellectually and self-con-
sciously the holy grail: the grand synthesis of Marxism with
academic sociology. 4
As much as Gouldner tried in the last two decades of his life to
establish a program of reflexive sociology and to find a balance
between the competing claims and visions of society offered by
functionalists and Marxists, neither of these efforts could be de-
scribed as completely successful (see Colvard 1990; Flacks 1990;
Fuhrman 1990; Hagan and Vaughan 1990; Johnson 1990;
Levesque-Lopman 1990; Phillips 1988). Indeed, just as he lauded
Parsons in 1979 for "using himself up" through his passionate,
lifelong attempt to bring sociology to the table of legitimate sci-
ence, Gouldner's own program, which fell far short of the sub-
stantive accomplishments of Parsons' program, nevertheless could
be considered successful only to the extent that Gouldner too
"used himself up" in his heroic struggle to show sociologists that
a blind allegiance to positivism and the assumptions of objective
knowledge were antithetical to fashioning a truly liberative soci-
ology.
The mistake that Gouldner made, and which also illustrates a
"nightmare" version of his reflexive sociology-see Gouldner's
(1980, pp. 380-389) discussion of "nightmare Marxism" for back-
ground-was in assuming that one cannot properly know one-
self, and by extension, cannot thereby develop theories that
maintain fidelity to the empirical social world, if one conforms
dramaturgically to certain prevailing cultural prescriptions and
proscriptions about what constitutes legitimate science. The case
of Parsons clearly violates these assumptions, that is, if we are to
take seriously Gouldner's own pronouncements about Parsons
and his life's work which he offered near the end of his life.
219
Social Thought & Research
Conclusion
To put all this in perspective, we must note that when Gouldner
slipped off this mortal coil back on Decemb~r 15, 1980 (he.was
in Spain on a European speaking tour), he did so rather quietly,
There were no brass bands playing and little fanfare in celebra-
tion of his memory shortly after his passing. He had alienated
and offended far too many persons during his lifetime for that.
Although he accomplished much during his life-far more than
the average social scientist-he also left behind a great deal of
unfinished work. But throughout his sixty years, from his child-
hood as a street-tough kid growing up in Harlem to the towering
intellect and scholar he became as an adult, Gouldner was a bat-
tler, a conquistador. He gave sociology as well as his life his all.
For his sheer tenacity and gritty determination; for believing in
something enough to fight and even die for; for trying to make a
difference in the world, even though he ultimately failed the big-
gest tests of substance and character-for all these r~asons and
more, I join Nord (1992) in viewing Gouldner as an llltellectual,
if indeed flawed or tragic, hero.
In his hermeneutical study of the writings of Sigmund Freud,
Paul Ricoeur (1970, p. 472) argued for a convergence between
Hegel's dialectic and Freud's guiding ideas, stating that:
It is always life operations that mark off the dialectic: to
risk one's life, to exchange it-to attain satisfaction, to work.
It is always the moment of nature, the otherness of. life,
that, in the proper sense of the word, fosters and nounsh~s
the oppositions of each consciousness to the other than It-
self.
This sentiment happens to reflect the guiding motif of Gouldner's
life and work as well. In Enter Plato, Gouldner put aside space in
the preface to describe the trepidation he felt as a sociologist ven-
turing into the world of ancient Greek philosophy. There he
(1965, p. vii) wrote that:
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It is bad enough when a man has to put his skills up for
inspection, but writing becomes a form of prayer when what
he places on the line is himself. Yet not all prayers can be
granted, and perhaps some are never heard. There is no
avoiding this hazard, and, at any rate, this is the only way
that I have learned: I have never believed that anything is
worth working on unless I seriously risk compromising
myself in doing it.
For Gouldner, then, writing was not merely a technical exercise
or simply a way of earning a living. Writing revealed an inti-
mate habit of mind, a way of life, an orientation to the world
(and beyond). All of the pursuits that mark the life of the
scholar-writing, debating, advising students, lecturing, research-
ing, as well as the endless rounds of administrative and commit-
tee work-represent in total the risking of a life for those com-
mitted to the role of critic. As a result, scholarly work is the
embodiment of one's heart and soul and everything the critic
stands for intellectually, socially, politically, psychologically.
Gouldner's tenacious, even heroic commitment to intellectual
matters, and his belief that such matters are consequential and
that critical scholars can change the world through their work
(for good or evil), are, I contend, good enough reasons for study-
ing and even admiring Alvin Gouldner.
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Notes
1 TIlls description of Parsons is deeply ironic, for earlier Gouldner (1969)
had argued that in order for sociologists to escape the tragic fate of subordinat-
ing themselves to the dictates of the sterile Apollonianism of positivistic social
science, sociologists must know themselves (through self-reflection, presum-
ably) so that they can "recognize the value of their human contribution as
sufficient to justify their lives." As Gouldner (1969, p. xxxvii) continues, ''When
great men can do this they will no longer need tacitly to project an inflated
image of themselves as gods." So Parsons avoided this tragic fate by "using
himself up" in his relentless quest to bring theoretical unity to sociology and
the social sciences via structural-functionalism and the AGIL schema. It ap-
pears, then, that in 1979, the year Gouldner wrote this eulogy for Parsons, and
merely one year before his own death, he had come to the realization that his
years of criticizing Parsons had been for naught. This issue will be returned to
shortly.
2 This point requires clarification. Obviously, religion does not simply
vanish with the dawning of the age of Enlightenment. Rather, Enlightenment
rationalization rationalizes even religion to the point that Cluistianity is seen
by Nietzsche as the prototypical "slave morality" where the earlier promise of
earthly salvation gives way to a new range of creeds (e.g., utilitarianism, social-
ism, evolutionism) that simply secularize and pluralize slave morality, thereby
acting as an even more systematic and diffuse mechanism of social control (An-
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tonio 1995, p. 8). Another example of this rationalization of religion is the fact
that the ancient Greeks were polytheistic, but later civilizations moved toward
monotheism, the latter of which Weber (1963) judged to be a more "rational-
ized" form of religious belief. Nietzsche also believed than in the modern era,
genuine Christian conviction had been largely replaced by the new slave mo-
ralities, and that faith in God was no longer sincere. Additionally, Nietzsche
was critical of the self-delusion of positivists who believed that science could
actually replace religion (Antonio 1995, P: 11). Finally, Nietzsche did not view
modern society as totally bereft of ultimate values, however, the only genuine
values remaining from which to draw meaning were aesthetic values.
3 As Gouldner and Peterson (1962, p. 51) explain, "There is in
Apollonianism a development of norm-sending institutions such as ceremonial
or ritual and of codified laws, as well as of groups and roles such as a powerful
chieftainship, authoritative judges, a restricted council, and an organized pries~­
hood bulwarked by beliefs in the attractiveness of the afterlife."
4 Kaplan (1971, p. 69) goes on to argue that "Gouldner is a Greek. He
contributes the golden mean and provides a model that gives a degree of au-
tonomy to man and integrates all the single-factors, weighing each according to
the degree of its influence." This is in reference to Gouldner's attempt to over-
come the single-factor theories of both functionalism and Marxism through his
program of reflexivity and synthesis. Kaplan is invoking the ideal of the Greek
dialectic, which, as we have seen, Gouldner held in such high esteem but which
he rarely attained in his personal life.
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